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Opening Statement
Making it Stick
By Ronald L. Carlson and Michael S. Carlson
very lawyer who sits
down to plan her open-
ing remarks for a com-
ing trial has the same question:
How far can I go in arguing my
case during the opening statement?
Can I mention the law? What about
drawing a diagram of the accident
on a blackboard? Will my oppo-
nent be able to stop me from dis-
playing a couple of my dramatic
exhibits to the jury?
Making one's theory of the case
"stick" from the very start of the
trial depends mightily on how far
the lawyer can go in opening state-
ment. Where the defense is primari-
ly a legal or statutory one, knowl-
edge of whether counsel can guide
the jury by reading a defense-
friendly regulation to them is criti-
cal. If a plaintiff is catastrophically
injured, exposing to the jury a photo
of his mangled body at the scene of
a collision is strong medicine at the
start of the case. Is it allowed?
The aim of this article is to assist
Georgia practitioners in effectively
preparing an opening statement
and to provide a blueprint for
responding to objections that
would frustrate that goal. By work-
ing within the legal boundaries
that control opening remarks,
counsel can creatively present their
case at this vital stage of the trial.
She can indeed make her theories
stick.
Visual Aids
Suppose there is an issue in a
criminal case regarding space and
dimensions. Two people were
killed in a stabbing attack. It took
place late at night in a townhouse
entryway. The defense claims the
defendant, who was clearly alone
that night, could not have commit-
ted the double homicide; a single
person could not have controlled
both victims without one of them
running away. Wrong, says the
prosecutor. The space where the
murders occurred is so constricted
that a burly attacker would have
been able to pin two people down.
An excellent way for the prosecu-
tor to convey the tight fit is with an
accurate diagram of the murder
scene, drawn to scale. Working
with the diagram in front of the
jury to point out where the bodies
were discovered gets everyone
believing that the lone defendant
could have pulled it off.
Where the defense is alibi, a
defense attorney may strategically
employ a timeline, demonstrating
that the presence of the accused at
a distant location precluded his
presence at the crime scene when
the crime occurred. He could not
have been at point A at an estab-
lished time and then traveled to
point B in time to murder, the
defense persuasively asserts.
Commercial civil cases, on the
other hand, frequently involve a
blizzard of names, dates and busi-
ness associations. The jury will see
this information as a morass of triv-
ia unless counsel creates an open-
ing statement strategy that dispels
the confusion. The prepared chart
seems to be the answer. When
counsel is involved in a complex
case and is dealing with a plethora
of names, dates and companies,
she is authorized to utilize charts
which identify the "cast of charac-
ters."
Retention of the otherwise dis-
tracting details improves remark-
ably. The names stick.
Will case law support the use of
a prepared chart? The Georgia
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Supreme Court says "yes." In
Higlzfield v. State,l the Court
allowed the use of a chalkboard
listing the participants in the
crimes and the expected witnesses.
It was properly displayed in open-
ing statement. In civil cases, a
statutory rule allowing the practice
has caused Georgia appellate
courts to wax even more strident
about the propriety of visual aids?
In Lewtyn v. Morris,3 the Court of
Appeals lield that the trial court
"overstepped its bounds" by sus-
taining an objection to use of a
blackboard to identify the locations
of the cars involved in a wreck.
Lewyn suggests an interesting
possibility. There are dozens of
areas of trial practice law where the
bench can go either way on a con-
tested question, without fear of
reversal. Multiple issues fall under
the umbrella of "judicial discre-
tion." Counsel's right to go to the
blackboard during opening may
not be one of those. Under Lewyn, a
successful claim of reversible error
may be constructed around a trial
judge's arbitrary decision to bar
use of the blackboard.
Of course, in this electronic age,
some attorneys may prefer
PowerPoint and other technologi-
cal methods over a simple black-
board. The controlling case law
does not preclude electronically
creative strategies for previewing
trial evidence.
Display of Trial
Exhibits
Often a particular piece of phys-
ical evidence is critical to a case.
This might be the object itself, like a
gun or a knife or a gasoline tank, or
a photograph of one of these items.
Obviously, counsel wants the jury
to be familiar with such evidence at
the outset, but a nagging question
resounds: Is displaying trial
exhibits in opening statement
allowed? As with visual aids, the
answer supplied by the Georgia
Supreme Court is "'yes." In McGee
v. State, the Court ruled that dis-
playing an exhibit during the initial
remarks to the jury "is a permissi-
ble part of the opening statement,
as its purpose is to help the jury
understand and to remember the
evidence."4
This technique often depends
upon counsel knowing in advance
that she can expose such items. At
times like this, a pretrial motion in
limine to admit particular evidence
is advisable.
Stating the
Applicable Law
In a criminal case, a federal pros-
ecutor tells the jury:
"The accused is charged under
August 2003 
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the U.S. Currency Structuring
statute. What is currency structur-
ing, ladies and gentlemen?
Congress passed a law in the 1970s
that provides that whenever a bank
receives more than $10,000 in cash
from a customer, the bank must file
a report with the government.
Some sharp characters then
designed their deposits to come in
just under the $10,000 deposit ceil-
ing. To remedy this abuse of the
reporting law, in more recent years
Congress enacted another statute.
It provides that if an individual
structures his banking so as to
avoid the reporting law, he is
guilty of currency structuring. That
is exactly what the defendant did
in this case."
At this point counsel is inter-
rupted by a defense objection:
"Objection, he is instructing the
jury on the law."
Does an attorney venture into
"argument" when he describes the
applicable law in his initial
remarks to a jury? "Not so," said
the Georgia Supreme Court, which
held in Kinsman v. State that coun-
sel's referring to "the applicable
law" in opening statement was not
error, and did not violate the
Georgia proscription against
"reading law" to the jury.5
In addition to Georgia, do feder-
al courts permit moderate refer-
ence to highly relevant legal princi-
ples in opening? Indeed, they seem
to have exceeded Georgia courts in
granting license to counsel to
explore legal doctrines. In United
States v. Strissel the prosecutor
explained the RICO statute in
opening, and that it applied to the
defendant, not just to racketeers
like Al Capone. The United States
Court of Appeals held that "[aJ
defendant need not be a mobster
[in order] to forfeit [his] assets,"
There is a distinction between making brief
reference to favorable legal principles on
one hand versus intensively arguing the law
on the other.
and accordingly the prosecutor's
comment was not prejudicial. 6
United States v. Rodgers also
approves prosecutorial legal direc-
tion to the jury. In opening state-
ment the prosecutor explained:
"It's the United States Attorney's
responsibility to present this case
to a grand jury. If the grand jury
finds probable cause that a crime
has been committed then an indict-
ment is returned."7 The defense
complained on appeal about the
nature of these remarks, to which
complaint the Court of Appeals
responded: "The prosecutor's com-
ment about the grand jury was
merely prefatory to the reading of
the indictment and was a correct
statement of how a federal indict-
ment comes to be."8
There is a distinction between
making brief reference to favorable
legal principles on one hand versus
intensively arguing the law on the
other. It is only the latter which is
prohibited. Having said that, one
commentary provides wise advice
about how far counsel should push
the envelope when urging law in
opening:
[T]he attorney ought to avoid
any extended discussion of the
law. The witness usually cannot
testify about the law, and it is
therefore improper for the attor-
ney to go on at any length dur-
ing opening about the law. As
we shall see, near the end of the
opening while she is expressing
confidence in her case, the attor-
ney can make a passing refer-
ence to the burden of proof. If
the attorney's case rests on a
statutory cause of action or
defense which lay jurors are
likely to be unfamiliar with, the
judge has discretion to allow
the atlorney to read the statute
during opening.... However, if
the attorney spends more than a
few sentences discussing the
law, the judge might intervene
sua sponte; in the jury's pres-
ence, the judge may remind the
attorney that it is the judge's
province to instruct the jury on
the law and admonish the attor-
ney to refrain from legal
instruction. 9
Colorful Language
Using colorful verbiage in closing
argument is not only tolerated, but
encouraged. 10 Less has been said
about the propriety of theatrical
speech in opening statement. What
if counsel wants to engage in dra-
matic language? Contrary to what
courtroom folklore might suggest,
counsel is entitled to utilize colorful
language in opening statement.11
Georgia courts allow this in civil
cases if the evidence supports the
terms invoked. For example, no
error was ascribed to the trial
court's allowing plaintiff's counsel
to refer to the defendant's train as
"barreling through Stockton" to
characterize its speed at the time of
the collision in question. 12
In Teems 2. State,13 the Georgia
Supreme Court allowed the prose-
cutor to state that the defendant was
20 
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"riding shotgun," to describe his
occupancy in the passenger seat of a
vehicle on the night of the murder.
The court held that "[tjhe remark
was a colloquial and colorful way of
stating what the evidence was
expected to prove, but was not
inappropriate or harmful error."14
Similarly, in federal courts it has
been held that where colorful lan-
guage of a prosecutor indicates "a
permissible preview of the charges
and the evidence to be presented at
trial," no error is present1 5 In a
civil case, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
determined that describing the
opposing party in opening state-
ment as having been "stoned out of
his mind" was not error.16
In United States v. Johnson the
defendants were convicted of
sending bombs to injure and
destroy British military helicopters
in Northern Ireland. The trial last-
ed 28 days. Later, certain of the
prosecution's opening remarks
were challenged as improperly
inflammatory. The prosecutor had
characterized the Irish conflict in
which the defendants were
involved as "an echo of sadness
from the graves of dead genera-
tions."17 Armed activism against
England was described as "blood)
but abortive." 18 The prosecutor
provided an image of ambush and
sabotage committed by the
Provisional Irish Republican Army
"amongst the hedgerows, stone
walls and narrow lanes of the Irish
countryside."'19
How did the United States Court
of Appeals react to this colorful
language? Extremely well, accord-
ing to the court's opinion. "The
challenged statements, in our view,
were not improperly inflammato-
ry. Though vivid and rhetorical,
against a background redolent of
long continued violence and car-
nage they did not exceed the
bounds of adversarial propriety. '20
Don't Get Stuck
While it adds interest for counsel
to utilize impact language, she
needs to avoid getting carried
away. At least three major pitfalls
can trip her up.
First, if counsel becomes pas-
sionate and swings too wildly, she
may make unwise concessions in
her speech. In a federal trial these
will bind her client and may cost
the party a victory. As indicated in
United States v. Blood, "a clear and
unambiguous admission of fact
made by a party's attorney in an
opening statement in a civil or
criminal case is binding upon the
party." 21
Georgia decisions have been
mixed on the right to send a party
down to defeat based upon what
her attorney said in opening. In a
civi' proceeding it seems that a
client is bound by statements of her
attorney made in open court when
such statements are made in the
client's presence and are not
denied by the client.22 However,
criminal cases appear to be differ-
ent. A much higher level of certi-
tude regarding the intent of the
party to admit or concede a point is
required.23  Notwithstanding,
instead of simply relying upon
uncertain precedent in an effort to
avoid the damage, why not exer-
cise a measure of caution about
making careless admissions during
opening?
A second pitfall is abundantly
clear in Georgia jurisprudence: If
you promise too much in opening,
it can be held against you. It is
appropriate in closing argument for
an opposing attorney to look back
at the opening statement of an
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opponent and deplore an oppo-
nent's omission of proof. 24 Thus, it
is appropriate for a defense attor-
ney to argue as follows in closing a
personal injury case: "The plaintiff
promised in his opening remarks
that he would supply, and I quote,
'ample proof of the plaintiff's dam-
aged mental state as a result of this
accident.' Members of the jury,
where was the expert testimony
regarding psychological injury?
Not one expert took the witness
stand to support his claim of post-
accident mental trauma. I submit
the plaintiff has broken the promise
he made to you in his opening state-
ment." Put bluntly, overstatement
at the start can kill you in the end.
Opening the Door
A final pitfall worthy of mention
is the inartful speech that allows
one's opponent to open a can of
worms. Assume there is certain
damaging evidence that your
opponent is barred from exposing.
Can you activate his right to dis-
close the prejudicial stuff by your
own opening statement? Yes, say
the Georgia courts, an:! examples
abound. Evidence otherwise pro-
hibited under a motion in limine,
for example, can be introduced
after an opening statement by the
movant explores the proscribed
topic.2' Similarly, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit has ruled that in federal
courts, a verbal attack by a lawyer
on a witness during opening is suf-
ficient to allow introduction of evi-
dence on direct which is typically
only relevant after the witness'
credibility has been attacked upon
cross-examina tion.26
Objection Strategy
In this segment of the article, we
shift gears. What should be couii-
sel's objection strategy during.
opposing counsel's opening?
While it makes good sense to
avoid casual or technical objections
during an opponent's opening,
there will be times whn a lawyer is
virtually compelled to object. It is
hornbook law in Georgia that an
objection to an offensive opening
must be made when the offending
remark is uttered, and not later. 27
Some cases even hold that waiting
to the end of an opposing attor-
ney's speech and then moving for a
mistrial is too late.28
Checklist of Objections
A list of relevant objections to an
improper opening statement may
be helpful at this point. In Georgia,
objections can and should be made
for the following:
* Addressing jurors by name
* Argument of the law
* Arguing the credibility of
expected witnesses
n Arguing facts, and drawing
inferences and conclusions from
them
a Emotional appeals
a Inflammatory rhetoric
m Racial or ethnic appeals
* Referencing inadmissible evi-
dence
Argument
The central objection that will
likely be made to your opening, or
which you will be compelled to
assert against an opponent, is
"objection, argument." Argument
occurs when your opponent infers
or concludes from the expected evi-
dence. A hypothetical example
from defense counsel's opening in
a civil fraud case illustrates:
"Members of the jury, the real cul-
prit in this case is the plaintiff's first
witness, the plaintiff himself, Harry
S. Dexter. Wait to form imprL.,sions
until you have heard my cr,,-
examination. In between his false-
hoods, I will tear out the few bits of
truth contained in this man. It will
be tough. But at the end of the day,
you will be able to conclude that
the supreme liar in the case is none
other than Mr. Dexter!"
Objectionably argumentative
statements usually take one of
three forms. First, there is an
improper diatribe about credibility
of a witness, as the prior paragraph
illustrates. Next, the attorney some-
times improperly draws an infer-
ence from the circumstantial evi-
dence in the case. Finally, the attor-
ney ought tu avoid any extended
discussion of the law.29
It is helpful to note what does
not constitute improper argument.
Counsel's description of the trial
process-who goes first and who
goes last-is not argument.30
Further, counsel does not err by
"framing the case," as when she
tells the jury what the key issue will
boil down to.31
Preparation
This article would be incomplete
without a word about preparing
the successful opening. It is advis-
able to practice the opening state-
ment in advance of trial. Few
lawyers become good persuaders
by giving their speeches for the first
time at trial. Practice them in nonle-
gal settings, on friends and with
family. It is a truism that speaking
in public - the very thing a lawyer
must do when delivering a Lourt-
room opening - is a major fear
faced by human beings. Practice
and rehearsal help to control this
fear.
Conclusion
Perhaps no area of trial practice
is as critical or enigmatic as that of
22 
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opening statements. It is an area
that successful lawyers must mas-
ter, because a slow start can doom
one's effort. As one commentator
remarked: "A trial is like an athlet-
ic contest in this respect: It's hard to
come from behind and win."32
While some pundits of trial
advocacy claim that as many as 80
percent of jurors decide the out-
come of a case right after openings,
few sources provide specific, case-
based guidelines as to what is and
is not allowed. As a consequence,
advocates all too often artificially
constrain their initial presentations
to juries, and fail to make the kind
of "first impression" that will last.
In criminal cases, a prosecuting
attorney may state in opening state-
ment what she expects in good faith
that the evidence will show during
the trial of the case.33 Similarly, in the
civil context, Georgia courts author-
ize counsel to state to the jury what
she expects to prove at the trial.34
Within those parameters, attorneys
are entitled to use compelling lan-
guage, show exhibits and illustrate
their theories with visual aids.
With jurors becoming more and
more demanding about the level of
advocacy counsel must employ at all
stages of a trial, trial lawyers must
know of all the legal tools at their
disposal. Hopefully, this article has
provided Georgia practitioners with
guidance and a fresh perspective on
achieving more during their critical
opening statements. *
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